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Smolla
Argues Before

Cross-burning
_case explores
free-speech
controversy
By John G. Douglass

A First Amendment advocate's greatest burden can be his own client.
1bose clientS range from the ojjbeat to the da.ngerous, from pornog-

raphers to neo-Nazis. Yet in standing up for the disreputabk client,
thefree sprech admcale standsfor one of011r most cherishedfreedoms:

"Ifthere is a bedrock principk underlying the First Amendment. et
is that the Government may not prohibit the expression ofan idea
simply beca11Se societyfinds the ilka itselfoffensitie or disagrmlhk."
Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
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As one of the nation's leading First Amendment advocates, Allen Professor Rodney
Smolla understands that burden as well as
anyone. No doubt he felt it keenly at 10:31
a.m. on Dec. 11, 2002, when he rose before a packed gallery in the U.S. Supreme
Court to argue that the First Amendment
protects symbolic speech, even when the
symbol is as repulsive as a Klansman's
burning cross.
Virginia v. Black was Smolla's first oral
argument before the Supreme Court, but his
appearance on the national stage of First
Amendment controversy was nothing new.
Among academics, Smolla has long been

regarded as a leading First Amendment voice.
His publications include a widely-used

casebook, top law review articles, plays,
short stories, a forthcoming novel, and a
nonfiction work that became the script for a
popular movie. As a litigator of two decades
experience, he has argued First Amendment
appeals in dozens of state and federal courts
around the nation. Early in his career, he
had a knack for finding big First Amendment
cases. These days, such cases find him.
Smolla first encountered the case of Barry
Elton Black in September 1998. A month
earlier, Black had led a Ku Klux Klan rally
on a Carroll County farm, where he ignited
a thirty-foot cross that was visible from a
three-quarter mile stretch of public highway.
Charged under a Virginia statute that makes

it a felony to bum a cross "with the intent
of intimidating any person," Black asked
the Virginia Chapter of the American Civil
liberties Union to take his case. Along with
Richmond criminal defense lawyer David
Baugh, Smolla sat on an ACLU committee
that considered the request. Baugh stepped
forward to represent Black at trial, while
Smolla agreed to handle any resulting appeals. Both Baugh and Smolla served pro
bono. Smolla took the case partly out of
admiration for Baugh, an African-American,
who had the courage to represent a white
racist in a highly visible case. And - as
Smolla later remarked - he took the case
to prove a point: "Freedom of speech only
matters where the speech is unpopular."

Over the course of three years Smolla
briefed and argued Black's appeals, first to
the Virginia Court of Appeals, then to the
Supreme Court of Virginia, where the case
was consolidated after oral argument with
a separate appeal from Virginia Beach. In
that case, two youths had been convicted
under the same Virginia cross-burning
statute for trying to bum a small wooden
cross in the yard of an African-American
neighbor. On Nov. 2, 2001, by the narrow
margin of 4 to 3, the Supreme Court of
Virginia reversed all three convictions.
The Virginia decision immediately
attracted widespread attention. Many misunderstood its effect, wrongly concluding
that it left law enforcement powerless to
stop those who use the burning cross as a
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tool of intimidation. In fact, the Virginia
Supreme Court struck down the statute on a
far more limited ground, holding that it
violated the First Amendment because it
singled out a particular form of symbolic
speech - cross-burning - based solely on
the speaker's point of view, while it left
other forms of threatening speech untouched.
Indeed, even as Virginia's attorney general
sought to appeal the Black decision to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the General Assembly enacted
new legislation that avoided the First
Amendment issue simply by making it a
crime to bum "an object" for the purpose of
intimidation.
The landscape of First Amendment law is
mapped in broad strokes, and Virginia's
decision fell into a troubled no-man's land.
The U.S. Supreme Court had struck down a
Minnesota cross-burning statute 10 years
earlier in RA. V v. City ofSt. Paul, 505 U.S.
377 (1992), but that opinion left more questions than answers. In 10 years, courts in
four states had invalidated cross-burning
statutes, while three state supreme courts had
upheld them. When the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Virginia v. Black, the
stage was set to settle that controversy. And
the case carried much broader First Amendment implications. The line between true
threats and intimidating conduct - which
the law can punish - on the one hand, and
obnoxious or hateful speech - which the
First Amendment protects - on the other,
has never been a simple line to draw. Symbolic speech - like a burning American
flag, a burning draft card or a burning cross
- only magnifies the line-drawing problem. Symbols are powerful rhetorical
devices, but they can be ambiguous. And
the use of a symbol blurs any easy distinc-

tion between speech and conduct. Given
the high stakes, it was not surprising when
15 states filed amicus briefs in support of
Virginia's statute, while First Amendment
interest groups as diverse as the Thomas
Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free
Expression and the Rutherford Institute
filed briefs urging the Court to strike down
the cross-burning statute. The Solicitor
General of the United States filed an amicus
brief as well, largely to protect the
government's ability to prosecute cross
burning under federal civil rights statutes.
In a case of such national note, preparation
for oral argument is not a solitary affair.
With the aid of colleagues around the country,
Smolla organized a series of "mootings. "
Before he faced the real court, Smolla was
grilled five times by panels featuring retired
federal judges, former Supreme Court
clerks and noted academics. Closer to
home, University law faculty joined Smolla's
students in the moot courtroom to play roles
as Supreme Court justices, peppering Smolla
with tough questions. Undergraduates participated too, in a student forum at the Jepson
School. There, Smolla learned that nonlawyers were moved more by the terrifying
symbolism of the burning cross than by the
niceties of First Amendment line-drawing.
A lunchtime debate with the law school's
John Marshall scholars was especially productive. Smolla presented one of the
government's most compelling arguments:
that cross-burning could be outlawed because
a burning cross is, by definition, a threat of
violence, and real threats can be punished
without violating the First Amendment. A
student responded with a hypothetical. What
if, the student asked, a terrorist group invented a symbol which it used solely as a

''Freedom of s eech
onl matters where the
Rodney Smolla
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calling card before acts of violence? What
if, years later, a dissident political group
adopted the same symbol for the purpose
of shocking audiences and calling attention
to its political message?
The point was subtle but significant.
Symbols are not static. One generation's
threat may be another's political manifesto.
To outlaw the symbol itself, for all time, is
to ignore the reality that symbols, like spoken
words, can change meaning over time. Smolla
liked the argument, and it became part of
his arsenal for December 11. He would
need it, and more.
The early morning of December I I brought
an ice storm to Washington, D.C., enough
to convince Richmonders to try Amtrak, rather
than 1-95. The Washington press corps arrived
in taxicabs, with badges announcing their
pedigrees in large print - ABC, CBS, CNN,
Los Angeles Times - as they crammed
through the metal detectors at the court's
north entrance. The reporters had the luxury
of a cup of coffee in the pressroom, where
a sign occupying most of a wall read:
"Amendment I: Congress shall make no
law ...abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press." It was an omen, perhaps, but
one never seen by counsel, who shook off
their overcoats then headed up marble steps
and through the immense oak doors that
separate the Great Hall from the Supreme
Court Chamber.
The room was beginning to fill as Smolla
took the respondent's seat just to the left of
counsel's podium. Ten feet in front of him
rose the court's bench, polished
mahogany spreading 60 feet from side to
side to accommodate nine black leather
chairs. It seemed designed to leave counsel
surrounded, unable to see justices at one
end while responding to a question from
the other flank. Today, that effect would be
magnified by the absence of Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, whose recuperation
from surgery would leave the advocates
standing before an empty seat, with four
black robes looming on either side. The
gavel sounded at 10:02 a.m.
The argument began routinely enough.
Virginia's state solicitor, William Hurd,
seized the opening moment to argue that
the Virginia statute was aimed at threaten-

ing conduct, not at the content of the crossburner's obnoxious message.
"Our statute," Hurd argued, "does not ban
all cross-burning, only cross-burning used
to threaten bodily harm." Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor turned the argument into a trap,
pointing out a "troublesome" passage in the
statute that allowed juries to infer an "intent
to intimidate" from the act of cross-burning
alone. Her question set the tone for the next
15 minutes, which occupied Hurd largely
in a technical debate over inferences and
jwy instructions. As Hurd sat down, it seemed
that the court might be headed toward a
narrow decision, striking down the "inferred
intent" part of the statute and avoiding the
main First Amendment issues.
U.S. Deputy Solicitor General Michael
Dreeben spoke next.
"Virginia has singled out cross-burning
with the intent to intimidate because it is a
particularly threatening form of such conduct."
Dreeben never had to finish the point.
Justice Clarence Thomas, who rarely
speaks during oral argument, finished it for
him. "We had almost 100 years of lynching
and activity in the South by the ... Ku Klux
Klan ... and the cross was a symbol of that
reign of terror." In a courtroom stunned to
silence by the passionate words and the
personal tone of the court's lone AfricanAmerican, Thomas continued, "It is unlike
any symbol in our society. There was no
other purpose to the cross .. .It was intended
to cause fear and to terrorize a population. "
In an instant, the tone of the argument had
changed and its significance had exploded.
The case was no longer about intricate distinctions posed by statutory language.
History, Thomas had suggested, can make
a symbol so dangerous that the government
can simply remove it from public sight. A
huge stack of First Amendment chips had

just been thrust on the table. And now it
was 10:31 a.m.

Smolla stepped to the podium without
notes, knowing he would have no time to
look at them. The next 30 minutes would be
the most intense of his career as an advocate,
and he wanted to focus on the justices. He
was less than a full sentence into the argument
when Justice Antonin Scalia picked up on
Thomas' theme, comparing a burning cross
to a brandished firearm . Justice David H.
Souter joined in, "How does your argument
account for the fact that the cross has
acquired a potency ... at least equal to that
of a gun?" Scalia piled on, "If you were a
black man at night, you'd rather see a man
with a rifle than see a burning cross on your
front lawn."
Struggling to defuse the emotion of the
moment, Smolla responded in a measured
tone, "I totally accept the history that Justice
Thomas has recounted." Then he redirected
the argument.
"As powerful as all of those points are,
there's not a single interest that society seeks
to protect [by banning cross-burning] that
cannot be vindicated ... as well ... by contentneutral alternatives. " The tactic worked, at
least momentarily, as the discussion shifted
to the court's decision in R.A . V. But as his
time wound down, Smolla sensed he had to
confront the history of cross-burning head on.
He turned to the hypothetical he had vetted
weeks earlier with the John Marshall scholars.
"Even if at a given moment in time you
could take some symbol and freeze it and
say ... this symbol always seems associated
with violence ... " Smolla began. Justice
Stephen G. Breyer interrupted Smolla in
mid-sentence while nodding, "You have a
very interesting point."
The exchange offered Smolla a moment's
opening to drive home his theme. Yes, his-

torically cross-burning has been about
intimidation. But it can also convey ideas.
While the government may punish threats of
violence that may accompany cross burning,
Smolla argued, it must do so without punishing the political and social message of the
cross-burner, no matter how offensive and
hateful the content of that message.

Moments after e argument endeo pundits
stood in the icy rain on the courthouse steps,
recounting Justice Thomas' passionate speech
and speculating that it signaled the court's
willingness to ban cross-burning. Surrounded
by staff members, Virginia Attorney General
Jerry Kilgore spoke to a television audience
about "freedom from fear. " Smolla faced the
cameras alone and responded, ''The point of
the First Amendment is that we protect even
the ideas that most of us find reprehensible."
Oral arguments are an imperfect window
into the Supreme Court's decisioncmaking
process. The court's final word will come
later this spring. When the courtroom drama
ended in Virginia v. Black, only one thing
was clear: defending free speech is not for
the faint of heart. In the court's basement
cafeteria, Smolla had less than an hour to
unwind before appearing for a panel discussion with the National Association of
Attorneys General. His afternoon was
already filled with scheduled interviews
and talk show appearances, and his cell
phone was crowded with requests for more.
A friend asked what it felt like to argue before
the high court. "Like walking into a buzz
saw," Smolla quipped. "But I'd do it again
tomorrow. "
In all likelihood, he will.

john G. Do11glass was a lawyer in private practice
and a federal prosec11tor be/ore joining the law
school f ac11lty.
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